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WHEN SOMETHING WICKED THIS WAY COMES:1 EVOLVING
STANDARDS OF INDECENCY—THOMPSON AND STANFORD
REVISITED
“The day may come when we must decide whether a legislature may
deliberately and unequivocally resolve upon a penalty authorizing capital
punishment for crimes committed at the age of 15.”2
-Justice O’Connor
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I. INTRODUCTION
From colonial times through the late 1800s, children and adults were tried and
sentenced in the same penal system. In 1899, Illinois established the first juvenile
justice system in an effort to separate juveniles from adult crimes and punishments.3
Almost a century later, with all fifty states having implemented a juvenile justice
1

William Shakespeare, Macbeth (The Three Witches).

2

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 855 (1988).

3

Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the Child?, 26
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147, 162 (1995).
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system, the rehabilitative capabilities of such systems have come under attack as the
nation is confronted with stories that a fifteen-year-old boy sodomized and murdered
an eleven-year-old boy who was selling candy door-to-door.4 Another fifteen-yearold shot and killed a woman on her way home from work so he could “know what it
felt like to kill somebody.”5
A fourteen-year-old opened-fire on a morning prayer meeting at a local high
school, killing three.6 A thirteen-year-old sodomized and murdered a four-year-old
who was on his way to summer camp.7 Another thirteen-year-old murdered his
friend for his refusal to accept the apology of another child,8 while a ten- and elevenyear-old pushed a young child fourteen stories to his death for his refusal to steal
candy.9 Most recently, an eleven- and thirteen-year-old evacuated their elementary
school by triggering the fire alarm. They opened-fire on the unsuspecting school
yard with their stolen hunting rifles, killing five--four students and one teacher.10
The issue of whether children as young as these could receive the death penalty
was squarely confronted by the United States Supreme Court in Thompson v.
Oklahoma11 and Stanford v. Kentucky.12 Under Thompson, a fifteen-year-old may
not be executed.13 Under Stanford, sixteen-year-olds may be sentenced to death.14
However, Justice O’Connor warned, in her Thompson concurrence, that reliable
evidence will one day become available to ascertain the moral and criminal
culpabilities of fifteen-year-old murderers.15 As a result, a national consensus could
develop in favor of reducing the minimum age of juvenile death eligibility to fifteen
and under.
The standard used to determine whether execution for children is constitutionally
permitted is whether such executions comport with the “evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”16 That standard remains
undefined. The Court instead has relied upon relevant legislative enactments and an
analysis of jury behavior as objective indicators of our evolving standards of
decency. Thus, the Court, in large part, has placed the power of constitutional

4

Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 24, 1997).

5

NBC Nightly News (Dec. 26, 1997).

6

The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 2, 1997).

7
Ben Dobbin, Parents of Slain 4-Year-Old Still Struggle 4 Years Later, BUFF. NEWS, Aug.
10, 1997, at A22.
8

CBS Evening News (Sept. 3, 1994).

9

CBS Evening News (Oct. 14, 1994).

10

Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 27, 1998).

11

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).

12

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).

13

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.

14

Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.

15

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 855.

16

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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interpretation in the hands of legislators. Politicians, not the judiciary, will
ultimately determine what punishments are cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment. If, as a society, we allow for a reduction in the minimum age of deatheligibility and the resulting executions of children ages fifteen and younger, the end
result is that our standards of decency will become indecent. If the death penalty
becomes an option for children under sixteen, the unavoidable conclusion must be
that we have reverted back to colonial theories of punishment. Therefore, children
between the ages of seven and fourteen will be subjected to execution. The issue
facing the nation will again become at what age to draw the line. In this article I
argue that, as a society, we must prevent such executions and refute claims that, as a
result of the failure of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate killers before they
kill, a consensus in favor of reducing the minimum age of execution has evolved.
Otherwise, our “standards of indecency” will have become wicked.
Part II of this note presents the theories of colonial crime and punishment, which
ultimately led to the creation and waiver of juvenile jurisdiction. Parts III and IV
discuss the history of the United States capital punishment system, with an emphasis
on its application to juveniles through the landmark United States Supreme Court
decisions in Thompson v. Oklahoma and Stanford v. Kentucky. Part V examines the
impact of recent juvenile murders on our evolving standards of decency, in light of
the political manipulation of the dual misperceptions that juvenile crime is on the rise
and that juvenile murderers are not amenable to rehabilitation. Finally, I conclude by
warning against a reversion back to colonial theories of punishment by imposing
death upon children under sixteen.
II. HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
From the seventeenth- through nineteenth-centuries, children and adults were
tried for their crimes in the same criminal justice system. Children found guilty of
their offenses were subjected to adult punishments, including execution. In 1899,
Illinois created the first juvenile justice system to remedy the injustice of trying and
punishing children as adults.17 The juvenile justice system emphasizes treatment and
rehabilitation as opposed to punishment.
A. Colonial Crime and Punishment
Prior to the creation of the juvenile justice system, colonial courts relied on
Blackstone’s Commentaries, which were published in 1768 and established the
common law principles of both criminal and moral culpability for children.18
According to Blackstone, children under the age of seven lacked the capacity to
formulate criminal intent.19 A rebuttable presumption of capacity to commit a
criminal offense applied to children between the ages of seven and fourteen.20 If the
17

Strater, supra note 3.

18

Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for
Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 42 DE PAUL L. REV. 1311, 1314 (1993).
19

Etta J. Mullin, At What Age Should They Die? The United States Supreme Court
Decision with Respect to Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty, Stanford v. Kentucky and
Wilkins v. Missouri, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 161, 163 (1990).
20

Id.
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presumption of capacity was successfully rebutted, such that the child was found to
appreciate the difference between right and wrong, the child could be convicted of a
criminal offense and thus subjected to adult punishments, including death.21
In accordance with Blackstone’s principles, the colonial courts sentenced two
boys, ages eight and ten, to death, along with a thirteen-year-old girl who was burned
to death.22 In 1885, a ten-year-old Cherokee Indian was hanged.23
B. Creation of the Juvenile Justice System
A reform movement in the 1890s sparked the creation of a juvenile justice system
to protect children from both the adult penal system and execution.24 The first
juvenile justice system was created in Illinois in 1899.25 The theory behind the
juvenile justice system is that juveniles are less criminally and morally responsible
than are adults, as they lack the same capacity to commit criminal offenses. Because
children are less blameworthy and lack the discipline to exercise self-control, they
are likewise more prone to rehabilitation than are adults. Therefore, the theory is
that children should be clinically treated as opposed to punished in the adult penal
system.26
The rehabilitative treatment theory underlying the juvenile justice system has
recently come under attack with the increased publicity of brutal murders committed
by children. Along with the increased publicity comes the politically-fueled and
media-fed misperception that the juvenile justice system’s efforts to rehabilitate
these children has failed. Thus, the perception is that the only viable alternative is to
lower the minimum age of execution.
21

Id.

22

Nanda, supra note 18.

23

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 829 n.27.

24

Sherri Jackson, Too Young to Die--Juveniles and the Death Penalty--A Better Alternative
to Killing our Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
391, 394 (1996). See also Glenn M. Bieler, Death be not Proud: A Note on Juvenile Capital
Punishment, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 179, 198 (1990). See also In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
14-16 (1967).
25

Strater, supra note 3.

26

Mullin, supra note 19, at 162. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967). Robert H.
Mnookin et al, Child, Family, and State 3 at 1097-98 (1995). According to Anthony M. Platt,
there are nine ideal points of a reformatory scheme:
(1) segregation of young deviants from adult deviants; (2) removal of deviant children
from unsound environments to reformatories for their own good; (3)denial of the need
for trial or due process legal trappings in the removal process because reformatories
helped rather than hurt; (4) indeterminate commitments; (5) denial of sentimentality
and resort to punishment where it became a necessary means to reform; (6) military
drill, physical exercise, labor, and constant supervision to protect reformatory inmates
from idleness and indulgence; (7) cottage plan physical plants in rural locations; (8)
tripartite school program based on elementary education, industrial and agricultural
training, and religious education; and (9) constant training in the value of sobriety,
thrift, industry, prudence, realistic ambition, and life adjustment. Id.
All fifty states and Puerto Rico now have a juvenile justice system where juveniles are tried
separately from adults for their offenses.
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As an alternative to adult sanctions, the juvenile “rehabilitation” theory should be
re-examined. If the juvenile justice system truly did provide treatment and
rehabilitation for children, those same children would be less likely to reappear in
juvenile court facing transfer into the adult penal system for subsequent criminal
acts. Indeed, the failure of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate juveniles rests
not on the inability of juveniles to be rehabilitated. Instead, the failure lies in the
system’s inability to rehabilitate.
III. HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND ITS APPLICATION TO CHILDREN
The United States Supreme Court has held that while youth is a relevant
mitigating factor to be considered when assessing a juvenile murderer’s moral and
criminal culpability, it is not cruel and unusual punishment to execute sixteen-yearolds who kill. Sixteen-year-olds are presumed to possess the requisite maturity to
contemplate and be held accountable for their actions. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,
the U.S. Supreme Court established that it is unconstitutional to execute children
under sixteen years of age.27 However, Justice O’Connor warned that the day may
present itself where we will have to reconsider whether fifteen-year-olds possess the
necessary culpability to be worthy of death.28 Some argue that the dawn of that day
has come.
The standard by which the Court determines whether death is constitutionally
permissible for children was first articulated in Trop v. Dulles.29 According to the
Court, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment “must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”30 In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court adopted the standard
articulated in Trop v. Dulles when determining that executing children fifteen and
younger offends our “evolving standards of decency.”31 However, the Court, instead
of defining the contours of “evolving standards of decency,” declared that we
determine evolving standards of decency in light of objective indicia such as relevant
legislative enactments and jury behavior.32 Thus, the standard is standardless. In
light of the fact that the standard has remained undefined and in light of the recent
publicity of juvenile crimes, some legislators are challenging the holding of
Thompson and are lobbying for a reduction in the minimum age of execution.
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the issue before the Court was whether it is cruel and
unusual punishment to execute persons who were fifteen-years of age at the time of
their offenses.33 In the early morning hours of January 23, 1983, William Wayne
Thompson, along with three older accomplices, savagely murdered Charles Keene,
Thompson’s former brother-in-law.34 Thompson severely beat Keene before
27

487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).

28

Id. at 855.

29

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).

30

Id. at 99.

31

487 U.S. at 821.

32

Id. at 821-22.

33

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 815, 818-19 (1988).

34

Id. at 819.
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shooting him twice, once in the head and once in the chest, and cut his throat, chest,
and abdomen.35 Keene’s leg was broken and he received severe lacerations to the
head and face.36 Thompson and his accomplices then chained Keene to a concrete
block and dumped his body in the Washita River, where it was discovered
approximately two weeks later.37 Thompson’s alleged motivation for the murder was
retaliation for the abuse Keene inflicted on his wife--Thompson’s sister.38 Thompson
and his three accomplices were tried separately and each was sentenced to death.39
William Wayne Thompson was fifteen when he brutally murdered Charles Keene.40
The question before the Court was whether Thompson’s death sentence was
constitutional.41 In a plurality opinion, with Justice O’Connor concurring in the
judgment, the Court concluded that the execution of a capital murderer who was
fifteen at the time of his offense was cruel and unusual punishment, as it violated
evolving standards of decency.42 Instead of defining “evolving standards of
decency,” the Court reasoned that a determination of whether a punishment offends
evolving standards of decency requires an analysis of two objective factors: 1)
relevant legislative enactments; and 2) the behavior of juries to establish a national
consensus.43
The plurality considered as relevant legislative enactments, the fact that
Oklahoma law forbids voting, participation on a jury, marriage without parental
consent, and the purchase of alcohol and cigarettes by minors.44 Furthermore,
Oklahoma’s juvenile justice system forbids most offenders under age eighteen to be
held criminally liable for their offenses.45 In fact Oklahoma’s civil and penal statutes
defined persons under eighteen as “children.”46
The Court deemed most relevant the fact that all fifty states had enacted
legislation setting the maximum age for juvenile jurisdiction at sixteen.47 The Court
reasoned that “all of this legislation is consistent with the experience of mankind, as

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 819.

39

Id.

40

Id. at 819. See also Dominic J. Ricotta, Eighth Amendment -- the Death Penalty for
Juveniles: A State’s Right or a Child’s Injustice? Thompson v. Oklahoma, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 921, 921-22 (1988).
41

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-19.

42

Id. at 838.

43

Id. at 822.

44

Id. at 823.

45

Id. at 823-824.

46

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824.

47

Id.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/8

6

1998]

EVOLVING STANDARDS OF INDECENCY

807

well as the long history of our law, that the normal fifteen-year-old is not prepared to
assume the full responsibilities of an adult.”48
The Court further noted that the majority of jurisdictions failed to specify a
minimum age at which a juvenile is eligible for execution.49 Eighteen states that had
established a minimum age drew the line at sixteen.50 Therefore, based upon relevant
legislative enactments, the plurality concluded that death for children fifteen years of
age at the time of the offense violated evolving standards of decency.51
The Court next considered the behavior of juries in capital cases and their
decisions to impose life or death. Statistics recorded throughout the 1980s and
presented to the Court indicated that a disproportionately small number of willful
criminal homicide offenders sentenced to death were minors.52 Out of the 82,094
persons arrested for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 1,393 were sentenced
to death.53 Only five of those persons, which included William Wayne Thompson,
were under sixteen years of age upon commission of the offense.54 According to the
Court, these statistics “suggest that these five young offenders have received
sentences that are ‘cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightening
is cruel and unusual.’”55

48

Id. at 824-25.

49

Id. at 826.

50

Id. at 829 n.30. 1) California (age 18); 2) Colorado (age 18); 3) Connecticut (age 18); 4)
Georgia (age 17); 5) Illinois (age 18); 6) Indiana (age 16); 7) Kentucky (age 16); 8) Maryland
(age 18); 9) Nebraska (age 18); 10) Nevada (age 16); 11) New Hampshire (age 17); 12) New
Jersey (age 18); 13) New Mexico (age 18); 14) North Carolina (age 17); 15) Ohio (age 18);
16) Oregon (age 18); Tennessee (age 18); and Texas (age 17).
51

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.

52

Id. at 832.

53

Id. at 832.

54

Id. at 832-33.

55

Id. at 833 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 309). See also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837. See
also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 835. The Thompson plurality next turned to a discussion of the goals
of capital punishment as announced in Gregg -- deterrence and retribution.
Deterrence
The plurality reasoned that specific and general deterrence goals are not met with the
infliction of death upon children who are fifteen at the time of their offense because children
are less blameworthy and responsible than are adults. The likelihood that teenagers, being less
rational than adults, will engage in a “cost-benefit analysis” is “so remote as to be virtually
nonexistent.” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837. Even if a fifteen-year-old would balance the pros
against the cons before committing murder, he or she would very doubtfully consider the
death penalty as a possible sanction based on the small number of executions during the
twentieth-century. Id. Therefore, the juvenile death penalty for offenders under age sixteen
fails to serve as a deterrent. Id.
Retribution
In Gregg, the Court announced that the test for determining whether a punishment serves
retributive ends turns on whether “an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly
offensive conduct” was ‘inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of man.’” Id. at 836
(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183). According to the plurality, the execution of fifteen-year-old
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In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor also considered both relevant legislative
enactments and jury behavior to identify a national consensus in opposition to
executing children who were fifteen years of age at the time of their crimes.56 Most
relevant to Justice O’Connor was the fact that every legislature allowing for juvenile
executions that established a minimum age for execution had set the minimum age at
sixteen.57 Adding to those states the fourteen states that prohibit capital punishment
all together, it appeared that approximately two-thirds of state legislatures refuse to
execute fifteen-year-olds.58 Justice O’Connor explained that, in light of the
legislation, “strong counter-evidence would be required to persuade me that a
national consensus against this practice does not exist.”59
When examining the behavior of juries, Justice O’Connor noted that the last time
a juvenile younger than sixteen years of age was executed occurred more than four
decades before.60 Only five out of 1,393 criminal homicide offenders under sixteen
were sentenced to death, leading to the inference that a national consensus exists
against executing persons fifteen years of age at the time of their offenses.61 Justice
O’Connor did note, however, that those statistics are not dispositive.62 For example,
the statistics did not provide the number of times juries were asked to sentence a
capital defendant under sixteen to death. The statistics also failed to establish the
number of times prosecutors refrained from seeking death sentences for those
persons under age sixteen who were otherwise eligible for death.
The lynchpin for Justice O’Connor, however, was the fact that nineteen states,
including Oklahoma, failed to establish a minimum age for death eligibility.63
O’Connor was unwilling to accept the dissent’s theory that those nineteen states
deliberately refused to establish a minimum age, thus allowing for the executions of
fifteen-year-old offenders.64 In light of the fact that every state that had expressly
established a minimum age for death eligibility set that age at sixteen or older,

minors fails to meet that test. Therefore, based on relevant legislative enactments and the
behavior of juries, along with an examination of the goals of capital punishment, the execution
of a juvenile fifteen years of age at the time of the crime offends evolving standards of
decency. Id. at 838. In fact, such executions are “nothing more than the purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering” and are thus unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment. Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 at 838.
56

Id. at 365.

57

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 849.

58

See also Id. at 829 n.25. The fourteen states which prohibit capital punishment
include:1) Alaska; 2) District of Columbia; 3) Hawaii; 4) Iowa; 5) Kansas; 6) Maine; 7)
Massachusetts; 8) Michigan; 9) Minnesota; 10) New York; 11) North Dakota; 12) Rhode
Island; 13) West Virginia; and 14) Wisconsin.
59

Id. at 849.

60

Id. at 852.

61

Id. at 848.

62

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 853.

63

Id.

64

Id. at 850.
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O’Connor was unwilling to infer a deliberate intent by those nineteen states to
provide execution for children under sixteen.65
Most important, O’Connor left the door open for the future when stating
“adolescents are generally less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes-it does not necessarily follow that all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the moral
culpability that would justify the imposition of capital punishment.”66 O’Connor
further opined that the plurality failed to produce conclusive evidence that fifteenyear-olds, as a class, could never be deterred from committing capital offenses by the
prospect of death.67 In conclusion, O’Connor warned:
The day may come when we must decide whether a legislature may
deliberately and unequivocally resolve upon a penalty authorizing capital
punishment for crimes committed at the age of 15. In that event . . . we
shall have to evaluate the evidence of societal standards of decency that is
available to us at the time.68
Thus, according to Justice O’Connor, a time may present itself where current
legislative enactments indicate a national consensus in favor of executing fifteenyear-olds. The shift in the national consensus will arise if society regards the fifteenyear-old child as morally and criminally blameworthy and thus eligible for death.
The dissent also analyzed the statistical evidence relied upon by the plurality and
concurrence relating to the number of states allowing executions and those that
define a minimum age versus those states that prohibit the death penalty under all
circumstances. The dissent primarily focused on the fact that nineteen states had not
defined a minimum age for execution, suggesting that the appropriate age for death
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 850.

68

Id. at 855. See also Seung Oh Kang, The Efficacy of Youth as a Mitigating
Circumstance: Preservation of the Capital Defendant’s Constitutional Rights Pursuant to
Traditional Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 SUFFOLK L. REV. 747, 776-77 (1994). Kang
reasons:
Examination of a youth’s culpability discloses a generalization that all juveniles are
less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes, triggering an assumption
that age disqualifies the youth from death eligibility. A bright-line test excluding the
entire class of youths from the death penalty, however, would negate an individualized
examination of the proportionality of capital punishment to the defendant’s culpability
and the goals of retribution and deterrence, thus conflicting with the traditional
fundamental values of the Eighth Amendment. Age instead serves as a “proxy,”
which, when analyzed with other factors such as immaturity, lack of sound judgment
and responsibility, and the inability to properly assess the ramifications of one’s
conduct, may render the death penalty inappropriate. Notwithstanding the criticisms
surrounding youth as a mitigating circumstance, youth constitutes a tenet of
individualized consideration in the assessment of the capital defendant’s culpability
and also serves to mitigate the defendant’s actions, not to categorically exempt all
juvenile defendants from capital punishment. The utilization of youth as a mitigating
force to establish automatic diminished culpability of the juvenile defendant would
offend the precept of the dignity of man and undermine traditional Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.
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eligibility should be determined on an individualized basis.69 According to the
dissent, the relevant legislative enactments, along with the behavior of juries suggest
a national consensus that executing persons fifteen years of age at the time of their
offenses is both acceptable and rare.70 The dissent reasoned it is absurd to suggest a
cold-blooded-killer one day under age sixteen can never be eligible for execution.71
Instead, once a juvenile is transferred to the adult penal system, all of the applicable
adult penalties, including death, should attach.72
The question of at what age juveniles become eligible for death was squarely
presented to the Court one year following Thompson, in the consolidated cases of
Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri.73 The issue before the Court in both
cases was whether executing juveniles sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time
of their offenses constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.74 The Court, using the
objective factors relied upon in Thompson, held the executions of persons sixteen
and seventeen years of age at the time of their offenses did not offend evolving
standards of decency and was thus not violative of the Eighth Amendment
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.75
On January 7, 1981 Kevin Stanford and an accomplice robbed a gas station
where twenty-year-old Baerbel Poore was working. After recovering 300 cartons of
cigarettes, two gallons of fuel, and a small amount of cash, Stanford and friend
repeatedly raped and sodomized Baerbel. With their goods secured, Stanford and his
accomplice kidnapped Baerbel from the premises and drove her to an isolated area.
Stanford shot her twice, once in the face with the fatal wound to the back of her
head.76 Stanford was seventeen. He was ultimately sentenced to death.77
In the companion case, Heath Wilkins, age sixteen, was convicted and sentenced
to death for felony murder.78 On July 27, 1985, after approximately two weeks of
extensive planning, Heath Wilkins, Patrick Stevens, and their other accomplices
robbed Linda’s Liquor and Deli, a small convenience store owned and operated by
Nancy Allen and her husband.79 Before committing the robbery, the group stalked
the deli through the bushes until the remaining customers left.80 Finally, carrying

69

Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868.

70

Id. at 870.

71

Id. at 857.

72

Id. at 863-64.

73

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).

74

Id. at 364-365.

75

Id. at 379.

76

Id. at 365.

77

Id.

78

Stanford, 492 U.S. at 367.

79

Id. at 366.

80

Id.
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bags stolen from a nearby hospital just minutes before, the group approached the
deli.81 One of the store’s owners, Nancy Allen, was working that night.82
In accordance with their premeditated plan, Wilkins approached the counter to
order a sandwich as Stevens sought refuge in the bathroom directly behind the
counter.83 When Wilkins ordered the sandwich, Stevens pounced from the bathroom
and grabbed Nancy.84 Wilkins drove a knife into her back.85 Nancy collapsed on the
floor, face down where she rolled into a spread eagle position with her back to the
floor.86 Stevens focused his attention on the cash register, where he quickly
encountered problems.87 In an effort to help, Nancy spoke.88 Wilkins responded by
plunging a knife into her chest three more times.89 While she was begging for her
life, Wilkins stabbed Nancy four more times in the neck.90 The proceeds of the
robbery consisted of liquor, cigarettes, rolling papers, and approximately $450 in
cash and checks.91 Nancy Allen was a twenty-six-year-old wife and mother of two
small children when Wilkins slaughtered her and left her on the deli floor to die.92
In a five-to-four decision, with Justice O’Connor concurring, the Court held that
the imposition of death on a capital offender sixteen or seventeen at the time of the
offense is not cruel and unusual punishment.93 In reaching this conclusion, the
plurality again considered relevant legislative enactments and jury behavior as
objective indicia of evolving standards of decency.
The plurality noted that, at common law and according to Blackstone’s
Commentaries, theoretically, a child as young as seven can be executed.94 The Court
further noted that fifteen of the thirty-seven states permitting the death penalty refuse
to impose death upon sixteen-year-old capital offenders and twelve of the thirtyseven states refuse to impose death on seventeen-year-old capital offenders.95
According to the plurality, this indicated a majority consensus that executing sixteen
and seventeen-year-olds is permissible.96
81

Id.

82

Id.

83

Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.

84

Id.

85

Id.

86

Id.
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Id.
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Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 366.
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Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
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Id. at 368.
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Id. at 373.
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Id.
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The plurality also considered statistics gathered from 1982 through 1988 which
indicated that only fifteen out of the 2,106 death sentences rendered were imposed
on offenders under sixteen, while thirty death sentences were imposed on seventeenyear-old capital offenders.97 The plurality opined that these statistics could be
regarded not as establishing a national consensus against the death penalty for
sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders, as defendants argued, but instead as
evidence of a national consensus in favor of such executions in rare circumstances.98
The plurality explained that the burden rested with the condemned defendant to
prove a national consensus against the death penalty for persons sixteen and
seventeen years of age.99 In order to satisfy that burden, defendants must show “not
that 17 or 18 is the age at which most persons or even almost all persons achieve
sufficient maturity to be held fully responsible for murder, but that 17 or 18 is the
age before which no one can be held fully responsible.”100 Because the majority of
states who permit capital punishment set the minimum age for death eligibility at
sixteen, the defendants failed to meet their required burden.
Finding that defendants, using legislative enactments, failed to prove a national
consensus against executing sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders, the plurality
turned to the behavior of juries. The statistics indicated that from 1982 through 1988
only fifteen out of a total of 2,106 death sentences were imposed on defendants who
were sixteen or younger at the time of their offenses.101 Only thirty death sentences
were imposed on children under seventeen at the time of the crime.102 In fact, the last
person younger than seventeen to have been executed was killed in 1959.103 While
Stanford and Wilkins argued that the statistics indicated a consensus against
executing persons under eighteen, the plurality argued the contrary; executing
persons under eighteen is permissible, but should be, and is, only rarely imposed.104
The plurality also explained that judges are not the appropriate audience for
determining the existence of a national consensus in favor of or opposition to
executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old capital offenders.105 Instead, defendants
must appeal to and persuade the state citizens.106 Because of their failure to meet
their respective burdens, Stanford’s and Wilkins’s death sentences were affirmed.
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor applied the same two-part test she
established in Thompson: the constitutionality of the imposition of death on juveniles
depends upon whether: 1) the state has established a minimum age for death
eligibility; and 2) whether a national consensus against the death penalty exists.
97

Id. at 373.
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Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374.
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Id. at 373.
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Id. at 375.
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Id. at 373.
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Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374.
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Because the majority of states established a minimum age of death eligibility at
sixteen and because the relevant legislative enactments and sentencing behavior of
juries were consistent with evolving standards of decency, O’Connor reasoned that
executing sixteen and seventeen-year-old capital offenders is not unconstitutional.107
Justice O’Connor again warned, however, that “the day may come when there is
such general legislative rejection of the execution of 16-or 17-year-old capital
murderers that a national consensus can be said to have developed.”108
The dissent declared that the imposition of death upon sixteen and seventeenyear-old offenders is cruel and unusual punishment and unconstitutional per se109
based on a different interpretation of relevant legislative enactments and jury
behavior. In reaching their conclusion, the dissent pointed to the fact that twelve of
the states permitting capital punishment forbid the imposition of death for persons
under eighteen.110 When viewed in conjunction with the fifteen states prohibiting
capital punishment under all circumstances, it appears that twenty-seven states agree
that persons under eighteen should not be executed.111 Nineteen states do not even
establish a minimum age, indicating that they “have not squarely faced the
question.”112
The dissent acknowledged the plurality’s contention that jury decisions to impose
death on sixteen- and seventeen year-old capital murderers are rare. However, that
fact alone is not conclusive evidence of a national consensus in favor of such
executions. In fact:
Just as we have never insisted that a punishment have been rejected
unanimously by the states before we may judge it cruel and unusual, so
we have never adopted the extraordinary view that a punishment is
beyond the Eighth Amendment challenge if it is sometimes handed down
by a jury.113
Consequently, the dissent concluded that the imposition of death on sixteen and
seventeen-year-old offenders is cruel and unusual punishment.
As a result of Thompson and Stanford, a bright line has been drawn with regard
to the minimum age for death eligibility; it is unconstitutional to execute children
who were fifteen at the time of their crimes, but it is constitutional to execute
sixteen-year-old offenders. However, Justice O’Connor concluded the day may

107

Id. at 380-81.

108

Stanford, 492 U.S. at 381.

109

Id. at 382.

110

Id. at 371 n.2.

111

See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 822-23 (1988); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 n.1.
The fifteenth state to abolish capital punishment was Vermont.
112
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 385. See also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829 n.26. The nineteen
states failing to establish a minimum age for death eligibility include: 1) Alabama; 2) Arizona;
3)Arkansas 4)Delaware; 5) Florida; 6) Idaho; 7) Louisiana; 8) Mississippi; 9) Missouri; 10)
Montana; 11) Oklahoma; 12) Pennsylvania; 13) South Carolina; 14) South Dakota; 15) Utah;
16) Vermont; 17) Virginia; 18) Washington; and 19) Wyoming.
113

Stanford, 492 U.S. at 386.
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arrive where our legislative enactments indicate a national consensus that fifteenyear-olds are both morally and criminally responsible for their acts and thus eligible
for death.
The common link between the two cases is the Court’s reliance on “evolving
standards of decency” for determining death-eligibility. That standard, however,
remains undefined and thus standardless. Instead, the Court has determined that
relevant legislative enactments and an analysis of past jury behavior are reliable
indicators of what is decent. Thus, the Court places the power of constitutional
interpretation in the hands of politicians. The reliance on politicians to determine the
contours of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment not only destroys the basic American promise and ideal of separation of
powers, but it is also simply indecent.
IV. EFFECT OF THOMPSON AND STANFORD: MODERN DAY NOTIONS OF EVOLVING
STANDARDS OF INDECENCY
In light of the increase in publicity surrounding recent brutal murders committed
by children, the issue facing the nation is whether Thompson will be revisited. The
increase in publicity surrounding recent juvenile crimes has led to the dual
misperceptions that there has been an increase in juvenile crimes and that the
juvenile justice system has failed in its attempt to rehabilitate violent juvenile
offenders.114 As a result of both misperceptions, state legislators are lobbying for
114

See Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 13, 1997) In October of 1997, Luke
Woodham brutally stabbed his mother to death before heading to Pearl High School, in Pearl,
Mississippi, with a hunting rifle in tow. Woodham entered the school and “pulled the rifle
from under his coat, walked up to his former girlfriend and shot her to death. Then . . . he
sprayed the crowded school commons with gunfire.” Id. Woodham killed two girls and
injured seven others. According to his letter, also known as his “manifesto,” Woodham
embarked on his hunting excursion because “people like me are mistreated every day. I do
this to show society – push us and we will push back.” Id. Luke Woodham is sixteen.
See also Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 24, 1997). In November, 1997, an
effort to raise money for the PTA and possibly win the grand prize pair of walkie-talkies led
eleven-year-old Eddie Werner on a door-to-door mission in suburban New Jersey, with candy
for sale. By the time Eddie knocked on Sam Manzie’s door, he had sold approximately $200
worth of candy. Forty-Eight hours later, the police discovered Eddie’s body in woods across
the street from Manzie’s home. According to authorities, “Manzie sexually assaulted and
strangled Eddie, robbed him of his sales money, then hid the body in a suitcase before
disposing of it in a wooded lot near by.” Id. Sam Manzie was fifteen.
See also NBC Nightly News (Dec. 26, 1997). Vincente Guevara had been guzzling a few
beers with his friends when a twenty-three-year-old mother of two crossed his path. She was
on her way home from working a double shift at the local 7-11. Guevara shot her in the back
of the head. He “wanted to know what it felt like to kill somebody.” Guevara was fifteen.
See also The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 2, 1997). In December, 1997,
Michael Carneal entered his Heath High School prayer meeting, in Paducah, Kentucky, after
kindly warning his friend not to be present that day. Carneal calmly inserted ear plugs into his
ears, removed the shotgun he had stolen on Thanksgiving day and showered the prayer group
with bullets. Carneal killed three girls. Carneal was fourteen.
See Ben Dobbin, Parents of Slain 4-Year-Old Still Struggle 4 Years Later, BUFF. NEWS,
August 10, 1997 at A22. See also Teenage Murder Denied New Trial, BUFF. NEWS, August
17, 1997, at A14. See also Judge Refuses New Trial for Convicted Killer, 17 Eric Smith
Could be Transferred to an Adult Prison Next Year, SYRACUSE NEWSPAPERS, August 17, 1997,
at B1. In 1993, Eric Smith lured four-year-old Derrick Robie into the woods while Robie was
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reducing the minimum age for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to provide for adult
punishments at younger ages. The logical result of reducing the minimum age for
transfer eligibility is reducing the minimum age for death eligibility.
In her Thompson concurrence, O’Connor stated that although most juveniles are
less criminally blameworthy and less morally culpable than adults “it does not
necessarily follow that all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability that
would justify the imposition of capital punishment.”115 O’Connor warned, therefore,
that the day could come where the evidence would have to be reexamined in order to
determine a minimum age for death eligibility that is in accordance with the national
consensus and thus evolving standards of decency.
A closer look at relevant threatened legislative enactments reveals that perhaps
the dawn of that day has come. Society, however, must be weary of any available
“reliable evidence” of a national consensus in favor of executing fifteen-year-old
murderers. The Court has identified legislative enactments as an indicator of a
national consensus. Assuming, arguendo, that all people vote, the assumption that
politicians provide “reliable evidence” of a national consensus is fatally flawed.
Indeed, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the information presented to the
people by politicians is objectively reliable. Politicians present information
necessary for soliciting votes, not for determining a national consensus. Thus, the
reliance on legislative enactments as “reliable evidence” of a national consensus is
not only misplaced but is dangerous.
A. Political Manipulation of Public Misperceptions
1. Recent Lobbying Efforts by State Legislators
In response to societal fear and outrage as a result of violent juvenile crime, some
states have enacted legislation which depart from and lower the minimum age of
death eligibility established in Thompson. For example, in North Carolina, a juvenile

en route to day camp. According to authorities, “Eric choked the pre-schooler, stuffed a paper
towel and a plastic lunch bag in his mouth and crushed his skull with a twenty-six-pound
rock. He sodomized the body with a stick.” Eric Smith was thirteen.
See also CBS Evening News (Sept. 3, 1994); CBS Evening News (Sept. 12, 1994); CBS
Evening News (May 16, 1996); CBS Evening News (April 25, 1996); NBC Nightly News (May
2, 1996). In High Bridge, New Jersey, eleven-year-old Jacob Tracy was shot in the chest in
his bedroom by his own friend. Jacob was killed because he refused to accept an apology
from another child. The friend and killer was thirteen.
See also CBS Evening News (Oct. 14, 1994). In 1994, five-year-old Eric Morris died
after being thrown from a Chicago public housing high rise. He was being beaten while
dangling over the edge. Eric’s nine-year-old brother attempted to save him; but, the attackers
bit Eric’s hands until he let go of the edge and fell fourteen stories to his death. Eric died from
massive internal injuries. His killers were ten and eleven. They killed Eric because “he had
refused to steal candy for them.”
See also Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 27, 1998). In 1998, Andrew Golden
and Mitch Johnson carried out their plot to activate their school fire alarm and, using deer
rifles stolen from one of their grandfathers, opened-fire on the Jonesboro, Arkansas
schoolyard. Four students were killed. One teacher was killed. Ten students were injured.
Johnson was thirteen. Golden was eleven.
115

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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as young as fourteen may be executed if he or she committed murder while being
incarcerated for murder.116
In Virginia, a juvenile may be executed at age fifteen.117 Arkansas and Utah
provide for death at age fourteen.118 South Dakota permits the execution of ten-yearold capital offenders, following a transfer hearing and trial as an adult.119 Support for
the death penalty as applied to juveniles under sixteen is further evidenced by the
fact that several states--Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Montana, South Carolina,
and Washington -- have not established a minimum age for death.120
Some recent efforts by state legislators to reduce the minimum age for executions
include those of California Governor Pete Wilson, who proposed twenty bills before
the legislature to overhaul the juvenile justice system and allow a “get tough on
crime” approach to juvenile offenders.121 In a transparent political soundbite,
Governor Wilson stated his support for executing thirteen- and fourteen-year-old
offenders, by declaring “no longer . . . will the welfare of the young felons be the
primary concern of the juvenile system.’ [Instead], the safety of ordinary, law
abiding citizens must be government’s top priority.”122
According to Wilson, the death penalty must be an option for children.123 In
support of Wilson’s poitically fueled declaration, Assemblyman Bustamante stated
he, too, would “default to say that a hardened criminal is a hardened criminal no
matter at what age.”124 “[W]ith a tear in [his] eye,”125 Bustamante declared he may
have no other choice but to support the death penalty for children as young as
thirteen.126 Quackenbush declared that “the only thing we can do is take these people
off the street and put them in cages where they belong.”127
Likewise, in the wake of the Jonesboro shootings, one Arkansas legislator has
proposed a law enabling prosecutors to charge juveniles with capital murder, without
regard to age.128 According to the Arkansas lawmaker “the bottom line is, you
116

Nanda, supra note 18, at 1313.

117

Id. See also Capital Punishment, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996 5 T.4 (revised
1/15/98).
118

Nanda, supra note 18, at 1313.
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Id.
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Id.
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Carl Ingram, Wilson Proposes Overhaul of Juvenile Justice System Politics: Governor
Presents 20 Bills to get Tough with Youth Crime, Including a Suggestion that the Minimum
Age for Death Penalty be Lowered to 14, L.A. TIMES, April 10, 1997, at A3.
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Id.
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Vincent J. Schodolski, 2 California Officials Suggest 13-Year-Olds Face Death
Penalty, CHI. TRIB., April 15, 1997, at 6.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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CBS Evening News (Jan. 8, 1994).
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commit premeditated murder and all the parts of the system say you should be
accountable as an adult, you can be held accountable as an adult.”129 Also as a result
of the Jonesboro shootings, a Texas legislator proposed a bill allowing for the
imposition of death sentences for children as young as eleven, postponing executions
until they reach age seventeen.130
2. Perceived Increase in Juvenile Crime
State legislators base their political platforms on juvenile crime, rallying around
the public misperception that violent juvenile crimes are on the rise. Yet, the most
recent report issued by the FBI indicates that the occurrence of juvenile crime has
decreased.131 Furthermore, in 1992, 66% of the crimes committed by juveniles were
property offenses, drug offenses, and public order offenses, as opposed to violent
acts committed against other persons.132 The perception that there is an upward trend
in juvenile crime is mistaken. Instead, there is an upward trend in waiver of juvenile
jurisdiction.133
Legislators argue that the failure of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate
juvenile offenders before they kill justifies adult trials and adult punishments,
including death. One commentator argues the philosophy on which the juvenile
justice system was founded is from a “bygone era.”134 “Yesterday’s delinquents had
fist-fights, shoplifted, and stole bikes and cars; today, they are armed with deadly
weapons and devoid of respect for others as they commit burglaries, rapes, and
murders.”135
These recent lobbying efforts by state legislators, when viewed in conjunction
with the states currently allowing the executions of children between ages ten and
fourteen indicate a growing national consensus in support of executing children
under sixteen. Because of the perceived failure of the juvenile justice system to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders before they kill, adult trials and adult punishments
may become justified. What remains unsaid and unrecognized, however, is that the
failure of the juvenile justice system is the failure to rehabilitate the juvenile--not the
failure of the juvenile to be rehabilitated.

129

Dateline (NBC television broacast, Mar. 27, 1998)

130

Id.

131

4/24/98 Agence France-Presse.

132
Laureen D’Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile
Offenders is not a Pancea, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 277, 282 (1997).
133

Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation & Execution: Transferring Children to Criminal
Court in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 447, 486 (1996).
134

D’Ambra, supra note 132, at 281.

135

Id. at 281-82.
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B. The Failure of the Juvenile Justice System
1. Failure of the Juvenile Justice System to Rehabilitate
In 1996, a twelve- and thirteen-year-old became the youngest inmates at a
maximum security prison.136 The two children were convicted at ages ten and eleven
for the murder of five-year-old Eric Morris. They dropped Eric fourteen stories to his
death for his refusal to steal candy for them.137 The young inmates were sent to
prison following a Chicago judge’s rejection of the defense claim that the children
were in need of psychiatric assistance.138 Instead, the judge chose to place great
weight on the fact that both boys had appeared in court on numerous occasions prior
to murdering Eric.139 Each time they appeared in juvenile court, instead of being
given treatment, they were sent back to their debilitated homes in the projects of
Chicago.140 While Eric’s murder and the subsequent waiver of jurisdiction over the
two young killers can be perceived to be a failure of the juvenile justice system to
rehabilitate two “monsters,”141 it can also be perceived as a failure of the court to
provide rehabilitation.
Similarly, three days prior to sodomizing, robbing, and murdering eleven-yearold Eddie Werner on his mission to sell candy door-to-door, Sam Manzie’s parents
appeared in Judge Citta’s family court asking that their son Sam be committed to a
twenty-four-hour in-patient psychiatric facility.142 The Manzies were afraid of their
son.143 Ordinary out-patient counseling was of no avail. Judge Citta responded that
the juvenile system lacked funding to provide Manzie with in-patient hospitalization:
I can only tell you, Samuel, that you have got to do the right thing . . . I
am also going to assume that you love your parents, and it’s obvious to
me that they care for you, but they’re afraid. And I don’t know whether
you’re a violent guy . . . I’m going to make your parents take you home.
You are 15-years-old. You must follow their rules. You’re not mentally
disturbed in any way. You’re not a psychopath. No? Remember the
difference between right and wrong and it will be fine. Good luck to
you.144
Three days later, Eddie Werner knocked on Sam Manzie’s door.145
136
Michelle I. Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: Betrayal of Childhood in the
United States, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 177-78 (1996).
137

Id.
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Id. at 177.

139

Id. at 177-78.
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Id. at 178.
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Baird & Samuels, supra note 136, at 178.
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Dateline, supra note 4.
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Again, the juvenile justice system denied a juvenile treatment for a lack of
resources; the result was murder. Thus, the failure of the juvenile justice system to
rehabilitate young felons lies not on the failure of the felon to be rehabilitated.
Instead, the failure of the juvenile justice system is the failure to rehabilitate young
felons.146
V. SOCIETAL RESPONSE TO POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF PUBLIC MISPERCEPTIONS
A. A Reversion Back to Colonial Theories of Punishment
With the misperceptions that violent juvenile crime is on the rise and that
juvenile murderers are not amenable to rehabilitation, comes the politically fueled
and media-fed misperception that the only viable alternative is to transfer the young
killers to adult prison to face execution. Not only does this “solution” ignore the
problem of inadequate juvenile “rehabilitation” facilities which serve as a
fundamental contributing factor to juvenile violence, but it also represents
abandonment of these children.
It is societal frustration and fear that are the vehicles for ultimately redefining our
standards of decency. However, society must be weary of political manipulation by
legislators when determining that a national consensus exists in favor of executing
children who are under the age of sixteen. Fear is leading Americans to call for
tougher sanctions for juvenile offenders. Americans want juveniles to be punished
and sentenced as adults.147 A recent survey conducted in response to the highly146

Id. See also Teen Murder Suspect Confused about Sexuality Parents Say, REC. N. N. J.,
October 31, 1997, at AO2.
147
Disturbingly, the failure to offer rehabilitation extends far beyond merely denying
psychiatric assistance to needy children. The failure of treatment has penetrated the walls of
juvenile facilities to create deplorable dehumanizing and anti-rehabilitative conditions.
Conditions under which juveniles are confined prior to and following an adjudication of
delinquency are harsh and penal in nature. According to one commentator, “while some
juvenile institutions may look like ‘home,’ most juvenile facilities resemble adult prisons.”
See Baird & Samules, supra note 108 at 182-83. Overcrowding is a continuous problem.
Some children are forced to sleep on cement floors due to a lack of bedding. Id. The confined
juveniles are not given adequate supervision due to under-staffing. Id. Behavior problems
often result, calling for an increase in use of leg shackles and handcuffs, and four-point
restraints. Id. Furthermore, every year, 11,500 out of 65,000 incarcerated children perform
suicidal acts. Id. at 198. With the overcrowding, lack of supervision, and increase in use of
restraints comes a lack of available treatment and counseling. Id. at 182. A recent study of
juvenile institutions conducted in New York revealed that the boys’ and girls’ facilities are
“characterized by high recidivism, homosexuality, inadequate treatment, poorly trained staff,
and numerous other signs of failure.” See Mnookin, supra note 26 at 1103-1107.
Several cases have appeared before courts throughout the states challenging the
constitutionality of the conditions in juvenile facilities. In an Indiana correctional facility,
boys between the ages of twelve and eighteen were being beaten with two inch thick fraternity
paddles. One boy, weighing 160 pounds, was beaten with the paddle by a staff member
weighing 285 pounds. See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354 (1974). The injuries sustained
by the beatings were such that one child was forced to sleep on his face for three nights as a
result of severe bruising and blistering. Id.
In Ohio, two children who were placed under juvenile court jurisdiction following
adjudications of delinquency, were transferred to Cleveland’s old County Jail to be “scared
straight.” See Doe v. McFaul, 599 F.Supp. 1421, 1423 (1984). Judge Leodis Harris instituted
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publicized juvenile murders indicates that a majority of Americans are in favor of
trying juveniles murderers as adults.148 Fifty-six percent of Americans believe that
children under thirteen should be tried as adults and face adult punishments.149
However, legislators fail to mention in their efforts to perpetuate and manipulate
societal outrage and fear, the cases such as Sam Manzie’s where, despite parental
pleas of concern, judges refuse to provide the necessary juvenile treatment for lack
of financial resources.150
Instead, legislators tailor their political platforms on the misperception that the
juvenile justice system has failed to rehabilitate these cold-blooded criminals.
Legislators depend on the power of public panic and political manipulation of
society’s misperception that juvenile crimes are on the rise. Politicians feed on and
fuel societal fear by advocating a “get-tough” approach to juvenile crime in the
aftermath of school-yard shootings and random murders committed to “know what it
[feels] like to kill somebody.” In the words of one author, “anything less than the
the program without making arrangements with the jail for handling the juveniles and without
regard to warnings by a corrections officer that the jail was unable to accommodate “juvenile
guests.” Id. at 1426. As a result, the two boys fell victim to homosexual rape by inmates
awaiting bind over to adult court and inmates who were already bound over for adult
punishment. Id. at 1427.
In Rhode Island, boys who were deemed delinquent, neglected, dependent and wayward,
along with boys who were voluntarily committed to the school by their parents, were
subjected to what the court described as “cruelty . . . much more comparable to the Chinese
water torture than to such cruelties as breaking on the wheel.” See Inmates of Boys of Boys’
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1359-66 (1972). As a result of disciplinary
and escape problems, some juveniles were transferred from their cottages to either the wing of
an old woman’s reformatory or a maximum security wing of the Adult Correctional Institute
(ACI). Id. at 1359. The boys were placed in cold dark cement cells, containing only a bed,
sink, and toilet. Id. The windows were barred and the toilets could only be flushed by guards
outside the cell. Id. at 1359. The juveniles were denied access to medical care, education,
artificial lighting, food, exercise, and visitor contacts. Id. Some children were housed with
adult prisoners, who subjected them to homosexual overtures and physical threats. Id. at 1361.
Other children were placed in solitary confinement; the boys were not given toilet paper,
soap, sheets, blankets, or a change of clothes. Id. at 1362. They were only permitted to wear
underwear. Id. at 1360. Confinement could last up to seven days. In declaring such
conditions unconstitutional, the Rhode Island District Court found the bug-out cells were
“similar to those used to test experimentally the effects of sensory deprivation; well-adjusted
adult volunteers have been found to hallucinate in such an environment in a matter of hours.”
Id.
The rehabilitative capacities of the juvenile system are hardly conducive to providing
effective treatment and rehabilitation. Instead of providing treatment, the system provides
overcrowded cells. The overcrowding leads not only to supervisory concerns, but also to
safety concerns. Most significantly, juveniles who are incarcerated in adult facilities are more
likely to become educated on how to become a polished career criminal than to be educated on
how to conform their conduct so as to contribute positively to society. Thus, upon release, the
juveniles are likely to continue along the same destructive path. Executions, however, are not
the solution. Instead, juvenile facilities must be revamped and restructured so as to
accomodate young felons with life sentences.
148

D’Ambra, supra note 132, at 299.

149

Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 27, 1998).

150

Id.
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harshest sentence is seen as ‘coddling’ of a young criminal.”151 The public is
manipulated into believing their hands are tied with regard to juvenile crime and the
only viable alternative is to lower the minimum age for execution.
Instead of overhauling the juvenile justice system to provide the necessary
treatment and obtain the necessary resources, executions are promised. However,
even in the face of transparent political soundbites, the commission of a violent
offense, while unacceptable, does not transform the juvenile into an adult.152 Yet,
“get-tough policies try to solve the problem of juvenile crime by lowering the age of
adulthood rather than recognizing the problem as a failure of society.”153 By
lowering the minimum age for death eligibility, we will be reverting back to colonial
theories of punishment and applying a rebuttable presumption of criminal intent to
children between seven and fourteen. The goals of treatment and rehabilitation for
juveniles will be forced out the window and the result will be a Seventeenth Century
system of punishment.
B. “Evolving” Standards of Indecency & Constitutional Misinterpretation
The Court’s past and current reliance on the undefined “standards of decency”
has opened the door to severe repercussions. The Court, in focusing on legislation as
an indication of our “evolving standards of decency” provides politicians with the
power of constitutional interpretation. Courts have the power to interpret the Eighth
Amendment. What is cruel and unusual punishment, under the Eighth Amendment,
will be determined by the politically-fueled- and media-fed misperceptions that
juvenile crimes are on the rise and that juveniles are not capable of rehabilitation if
the current system is left untouched. Thus, the contours of the Eighth Amendment
will be defined by standards of indecency.
“Evolving” standards of decency implies that, with the passage of time, our
standards, as Americans, have improved since colonial times, where punishments
were nothing less than barbaric.154 However, if our standards of decency have
“evolved” such that we will allow the execution of children under age sixteen and as
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young as ten, the inescapable truth is that we have traded our standards of decency
with a rebuttable presumption of intent and thus reverted back to colonial theories of
punishment.155
If juveniles were provided with the necessary treatment--or any treatment--upon
first entering the system, these children would likely not reappear to face transfer
proceedings following a later and possibly preventable commission of a brutal
murder.156 While it may appear that a civilized society is incapable of committing
uncivilized crimes, the events surrounding the 1944 execution of the youngest child
this century stand as a reminder not only of the possibilities, but of our
capabilities.157 On June 16, 1944, George Stinney Jr. was executed by electrocution
approximately two months following his conviction for murdering an 11-year-old
white South Carolina girl.158 The trial occurred amidst a political election. The jury
deliberated for five minutes. It recommended death without mercy. George Stinney
was fourteen.
Stinney, five feet and one inch tall, weighing ninety-five pounds, began his walk
to the death chamber, despite public appeals, including those from the victim’s
family, to spare his life. One commentator reports:
A bible — a gift from the sheriff — was tucked under his arm when he
entered the room . . . the ‘guards had difficulty strapping the boy’s slight
form into the wooden chair built for adults’ . . . young Stinney was such
as small boy that it was difficult to attach the electrode to his right leg.’
Stinney said nothing before the mask was lowered over his face. The
Record reporter observed that after the first 2,400 volts passed through the
boy’s body,‘the death mask slipped from his face and his eyes were open
when two additional shots of 1,200 and 500 volts followed.’ James
Gamble . . . remembers . . . ‘his head went up and the mask came of his
face . . and saliva and all was coming out of his mouth and tears from his
eyes.159
If today’s children were to face the same fate, our “standards of decency” will
have become wicked.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prosecutors are actively seeking the death penalty for children under sixteen
arguing the law is unsettled as a result of the plurality opinion in Thompson.160 It
follows that there has been an increase in publicity of recent juvenile crimes, with a
special focus on those children fifteen and younger. As an alternative to reducing the
minimum age of execution, the goals of treatment and rehabilitation should be re155
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examined and revitalized. While proponents rely on the apparent inability of the
juvenile justice system to rehabilitate juveniles when they first enter the system, the
actions of judges make clear that the juvenile system is often robbed of the
opportunity to treat and rehabilitate at-risk juveniles.161 The result is often murder.
Instead of executing children, society must recognize that the failure of the juvenile
justice system is the failure to rehabilitate the child--not the child’s failure to be
rehabilitated.
If society does, in fact, determine that the minimum age of execution should be
reduced, the dilemma again will be where to draw the line. Using our evolving
standards of indecency, we will inevitably revert back to colonial theories of
punishment by applying a rebuttable presumption of culpability to children between
seven and fourteen. Under the guise of a national consensus, we will create childsized death chambers to accommodate the tiny frames of children smaller and
younger than Stinney. In the end, our standards will have “evolved” to become
wicked.
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